“Club of Insiders”: Research Report Slams Collegium System as an “Opaque Oligarchy”

The report highlights a “political-judicial quid pro quo,” citing a pattern where judges who deliver pro-establishment verdicts are rewarded with high-profile elevations or lucrative post-retirement sinecures, such as governorships or chairmanships of tribunals.

RMN News Legal Desk
New Delhi | January 11, 2026

NEW DELHI — The Indian judicial appointment mechanism, known as the collegium system, has devolved into a “self-appointing oligarchy” that operates under a “myth of independence,” according to the recently released India Judicial Research Report 2025. The report argues that while the system was originally intended to shield the judiciary from political interference, it has instead institutionalized secrecy, nepotism, and a lack of accountability.

The Rise of a “Self-Appointing Oligarchy”

The collegium system—consisting of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court—was never part of India’s original Constitution. It emerged through a series of Supreme Court rulings between 1981 and 1998 that interpreted “consultation” as “concurrence,” effectively granting the judiciary the power to appoint its own members.

The sources state that this system has created a “club of insiders” where appointments are frequently based on personal networks rather than merit or integrity. Former Supreme Court judges have themselves criticized the process for its lack of diversity, noting that upper-caste men from elite families continue to dominate the higher judiciary while minorities and women remain tokenized.

Secrecy vs. Independence

The report challenges the notion that the collegium’s secrecy is a safeguard for independence. Instead, the analysis reveals a “shadow bargaining” process between the judiciary and the executive. The government often influences appointments by selectively delaying or sitting on recommendations for months to force compromises.

Furthermore, the report highlights a “political-judicial quid pro quo,” citing a pattern where judges who deliver pro-establishment verdicts are rewarded with high-profile elevations or lucrative post-retirement sinecures, such as governorships or chairmanships of tribunals.

A Systemic Crisis of Trust

The “myth” of independence was famously punctured in January 2018, when four sitting Supreme Court judges held an unprecedented press conference to accuse the then-CJI of manipulating case allocations to favor the government. Despite this watershed moment, the report finds that the collegium continues to function in near-total opacity.

Specific instances, such as the transfer of “inconvenient” judges like Justice S. Muralidhar, have further eroded public confidence. The report notes that when the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act of 2014 attempted to introduce democratic oversight, the Supreme Court struck it down as “unconstitutional” but failed to offer any credible alternative to ensure accountability.

The Path to Reform

To restore the judiciary’s moral authority, the India Judicial Research Report 2025 proposes several radical shifts:

• Public Hearings: Adopting a U.S.-style model of live-streamed interviews for all High Court and Supreme Court candidates.
• Independent Vetting: Creating a commission of retired judges, journalists, and citizens to review nominees’ financial disclosures and past judgments.
• AI-Assisted Evaluation: Using artificial intelligence to detect patterns of bias or inconsistency in a candidate’s previous judicial work.
• Cooling-off Periods: Mandating a 3-to-5-year ban on judges accepting government posts after retirement.

The report concludes that without these changes, judicial independence remains a “myth” that protects judges from scrutiny rather than influence. As the report states, “Independence without accountability degenerates into impunity”.